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1. A PENETRATING ACCOUNT OF THE GOAL ISSUE IN ARGUMENTATION STUDIES 
 
First of all, I would like to thank Dima Mohammed for offering us an insightful paper 
which sets out the distinctions crucial to the elaboration of a framework suitable for 
the analysis and evaluation of public political arguments. 
Dima provides us with a highlighting account of how the question of goals is 
handled in argumentation studies. The goal issue is crucial, in that an argument, as 
any piece of communication, can be understood, in the full sense of the word, only 
with regard to the goals it pursues.  
The French sentence “les carottes sont cuites” literally means that “carrots 
are cooked”; but once you’ve understood that, you’ve understood nothing. « Les 
carottes sont cuites », « carrots are cooked » may be uttered by a mother calling her 
children to come and eat; it may mean, in French, that an endeavour is devoted to 
failure and that any hope of success should be abandoned. Moreover, during the 
Second World War, this very phrase was used as a coded message by London 
clandestine radio broadcast in France in order to launch actions in the territories 
that were occupied by Germany. In all three cases, the sentence «carrots are 
cooked» is not uttered because it is true; the reason for uttering it is intimately 
linked to actions the launching or the abandonment of which may be considered as 
its goal. 
  I also agree with Dima Mohammed when she claims that “political discourse 
is multi-purposive”, as a “result of the multi-dimensional nature of the responsibility 
of a politician and other times [as] the result of the multi-purposive nature of 
political institutions or even simply because public political discourse is open to 
individuals and groups that have different interests and needs as well different 
commitments and positions.” One might add that, most of the times, political public 
discourse, inasmuch as it is public, addresses heterogeneous mass audiences, and its 
goals have to be understood according to the sub-audience that is being targeted by 
each argumentative move. 
Besides, I would like to add that, even if it is even more true as for political 
discourse, most of argumentative discourses, when submitted to an accurate 
analysis that takes contextual issues into account, may reveal multi-purposive; 
hence the issue addressed by Dima Mohammed is all the more relevant for 
argumentation studies. 
MARIANNE DOURY 
2 
Furthermore, I appreciated the way Dima clearly exposes and discusses the existing 
theoretical frames proposed by various scholars in the field of argumentation 
studies on the issue of goals in argumentation. I found her discussion systematic, 
open-minded and clear, in that the preferences she expresses are driven by what 
she considers to be the specific requirements of her object, that is, public political 
argument. Nevertheless, after having read her paper and thought for a while about 
it, I realized that I could not directly make use of the model she sketches within my 
perspective on argumentation. I could certainly use some important pieces of her 
reflection to feed my own research, but I could not adhere to the whole theoretical 
construction, for at least two reasons. 
 
2. “THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF ARGUMENTATION” 
 
The first reason is that, as I understand it, Dima’s focus on the issue of goals in 
argumentation is connected to her concern with evaluation.  
As she puts it in the introduction, her aim is to propose “a framework that is 
suitable for the analysis and evaluation of public political arguments”. On many 
occasions in her paper, she seems to equate “assessing an argumentation” and 
“assessing the rationality of an argumentation”; and she claims that such an 
assessment of the rationality of an argument should necessarily take the goals 
pursued by argumentation or by the arguers into account. Such a concern with 
evaluation leads her to discards whole sets of goals (for instance, individual arguers’ 
goals) from her framework as being irrelevant for the assessment of argumentation, 
and, specifically, for the assessment of public political argument: hence her 
commitment to the evaluation of argumentation has consequences for the way she 
conceives of goals. As far as I am concerned, my perspective on argumentation is 
bluntly descriptive. I don’t take evaluation to be incumbent upon me as an analyst of 
argumentation; hence, some of the constraints imposed on the conception of goals 
by an evaluative concern may disappear in a descriptive approach to argumentation. 
Furthermore, as Dima states in her conclusion, her focus on the evaluation is 
connected with her aim of improving argumentative practice. She thus proposes 
that “public political arguments be examined from a perspective in which the 
internal goals of argumentation are in principle instrumental for the achievement of 
the political uses of argumentation”, and she justifies this proposal as follows:  “This, 
I believe is necessary for an argumentative evaluation of argumentation to benefit 
the practice of political arguments” – I repeat: “to benefit the practice of political 
arguments”. 
My question then is: What does “improving the practice of political 
argument” mean? How can the analyst, through the analysis and evaluation of 
argumentation s/he proposes, help the arguers to improve their practice of political 
argument? Why would these arguers be eager to improve their practice of political 
argument – if it does not mean to gain in efficiency? (and I presume that, by 
“improving the practice of political arguments”, Dima has both rationality concerns 
and efficiency concerns in mind). 
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3. A TOP-DOWN APPROACH 
 
Second, and maybe as a consequence of this normative stance, Dima Mohammed’s 
paper may be characterized as obeying a top-down logic, whereas my approach to 
argumentation is fundamentally bottom-up.  
Of course, the distinction is not that clear-cut: Dima is not data blind – and 
some of her previous papers show an empirical concern (see for instance 
Mohammed, 2008). And as far as I’m concerned, I am not theoretically naïve: any 
relevant analysis rests on a theoretical frame and departs from expectations to be 
tested. Nevertheless I always feel uncomfortable with pre-established categories of 
dialogues, of activities, of goals. As François puts it in a somewhat provocative style,  
‘‘it would be naïve to suppose that one can start by first determining the goal one 
wishes to achieve in order to study afterwards the means employed to achieve this 
goal [my translation]’’ (1980, p.83). The underlying idea of this quote is that, on the 
contrary, one should identify first the discursive choices, and, in particular the 
argumentative choices, that one makes in an interaction, and then try to determine 
the effect these choices have on the interaction. Only then, and after considering 
these choices in relation to the properties of the context in which they have been 
applied, can one attempt to make a hypothesis on the goals that the participants 
have been seeking to realize through their argumentative behaviour. 
Even if I can acknowledge the consistency and sophistication of the models 
Dima appeals to in order to elaborate her own framework for the analysis and 
evaluation of public political discourse, I am very quickly put off by the difficulties 
posed by the application of such theoretical constructions to authentic data. For 
instance, it is almost never clear to me which dialogue type (Walton, 1992), or 
activity type (van Eemeren, 2010) a piece of interaction belongs to – and the 
possibility of resorting to a hybrid type does not provide me with any satisfactory 
solution. I am sincerely indebted to the scientists who identified the various criteria 
relevant for establishing such reasoned sets of dialogues, or activities, or goals – and 
the use of these criteria in order to characterize the data I am confronted with is 
very fruitful; but trying to force the data into a category established a priori with 
regard to these criteria is contrary to what I consider the priority of a descriptive 
approach to argumentation: that is, accounting for the crude reality of 
argumentative discourse, not seeking to interpret it with reference to what it should 
look like, or to an ideal prototype. 
In the same spirit, when examining authentic data, one may find quite 
convincing pieces of evidence that an arguer is oriented towards the achievement of 
one or another goal. But in many cases it is not easy – and here I am quite 
euphemistic – to decide whether a discursive or argumentative choice contributes 
to, or, on the contrary, endangers the achievement of a given goal – for instance, 
whether a specific argumentative move contributes to reaching an agreement 
between the parties. 
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4. MANY CONTEXTUAL, NON-SPECIFIC GOALS, ONE INTERNAL “MECHANIC” 
EFFECT 
 
My conception of goals in argumentation departs from the hypothesis that if 
language users argue, they do so because this activity serves a purpose, but this 
purpose cannot be determined a priori and without reference to the context in 
which this activity takes place, considering its institutional features, the genre it 
belongs to, the individual characteristics of the participants, the material 
specificities of the setting, etc. (Doury, 2012). 
Such goals are not specific to argumentation: they may be achieved by other 
discursive or even non verbal means. It is the specific relationship between a 
discourse and a counter-discourse that I take to be typical of argumentation, when 
argumentation is studied from a perspective inspired by linguistics and 
conversation analysis. I consider argumentation as a way of taking a stance and of 
elaborating on a position in such a way as to improve its resistance against 
contention. Improving the ability of a discourse to resist against contention may be 
considered as what argumentation achieves best – that is, as its specific goal, and its 
only context-independent goal. 
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